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Can Auditors Be Independent? –  
Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Client Type 
Abstract Recent regulatory initiatives stress that an independent oversight board, rather than 
the management board, should be the client of the auditor. In an experiment, we test whether 
the type of client affects auditors’ independence. Unique features of the German institutional 
setting enable us to realistically vary the type of auditors’ client as our treatment variable: we 
portray the client either as the management preferring aggressive accounting or the oversight 
board preferring conservative accounting. We measure auditors’ perceived client retention 
incentives and accountability pressure in a post-experiment questionnaire to capture potential 
threats to independence. We find that the type of auditors’ client affects auditors’ behaviour 
contingent on the degree of the perceived threats to independence. Our findings imply that 
both client retention incentives and accountability pressure represent distinctive threats to 
auditors’ independence and that the effectiveness of an oversight board in enhancing auditors’ 
independence depends on the underlying threat. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, regulators worldwide have stressed that an independent oversight board, 
rather than the management board, should be the client of the auditor.1 In the U.S., the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires that each listed company must establish an 
independent audit committee to serve as an oversight board that is directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the auditor (Section 301). Pre-SOX, the 
management was in many cases effectively in charge of nominating the auditor and 
negotiating audit fees (SEC, 2003; Mayhew and Pike, 2004). The European Directive on 
statutory audits of 2006 states that each public-interest entity must have an audit committee 
responsible for monitoring the work of the auditor, reviewing auditors’ independence, and 
issuing recommendations on auditors’ appointments (European Union, 2006). This directive 
must be adopted as law by the member states. In the U.K., the establishment of an audit 
committee is now mandated by the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (Financial 
Services Authority, 2009), but previously only recommended by the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2008). In the German two-tier system, 
the supervisory board, which is an oversight board that is institutionally separated from the 
management board, has been responsible for monitoring the auditor and for issuing 
recommendations on auditor appointments since 1998 (German Federal Parliament, 1998; 
Gassen and Skaife, 2009). 
In an experiment with professional auditors, we compare auditors’ behaviour under 
two client type conditions that differ from each other in both client identity and client 
preferences. This means that the client is either the management preferring aggressive 
accounting or the oversight board preferring conservative accounting. We describe the 
management as preferring aggressive accounting, which we define as income-increasing, 
given that regulators are especially concerned about auditor independence in such a scenario 
(SEC, 2003). In contrast, we describe the supervisory board as preferring conservative 
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accounting, which we define as income-decreasing. This preference structure reflects reality, 
because although oversight boards should be independent, at the same time they face a high 
risk of litigation, especially in cases where earnings are overstated (Hoi et al., 2007). This 
joint variation of client identity and client preferences contrasts the two client types that are 
most interesting in the context of auditor independence regulation. Doing so provides 
evidence of whether auditors are really more objective when they are “hired, evaluated and, if 
necessary, terminated by the audit committee” (SEC 2003) and whether it was justified to 
argue that “it strains imagination to see the auditor as independent of the management” if the 
management hires the auditor (Abdel-Khalik, 2002: 100). 
To reconstruct both client types in a realistic manner, we use the German institutional 
setting. There are about 20,000 companies in Germany with statutory audits under which 
auditors’ clients can be either the management or the supervisory board, depending on the 
company’s decision on the formation of a supervisory board and the company’s bylaws. 
These are private limited companies with more than 50 employees, which means that they are 
large enough that they are obliged to be audited, but less than 500 employees, which gives 
them the choice of whether or not to create a supervisory board.2 The legal threshold of 500 
employees ensures that a researcher would not expect to find any difference in the type of 
firm between companies that are slightly below or above that threshold, making the presence 
of a supervisory board as auditors’ client largely an exogenous factor.  
Further, we test whether the type of client influences auditors’ reactions to two of the 
main threats to their independence, client retention incentives and accountability pressure 
(Bazerman et al., 2006). Client retention incentives can arise when an auditor has financial 
incentives to become lenient towards the management in order to retain their mandate (Magee 
and Tseng, 1990). Transferring the decision-making power on auditors’ retention from the 
management to the audit committee should mitigate this incentive (Lee and Gu, 1998). The 
other threat, accountability pressure, arises when auditors who feel accountable towards the 
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management may be at risk of adopting the preferences of the management in terms of their 
own judgment (Bazerman et al., 1997; Bazerman et al., 2002). Such behaviour can occur 
when auditors unconsciously try to avoid conflict with parties to whom they feel accountable 
(Tetlock, 1985). In its role as an auditor’s client, an oversight board might ensure that auditors 
feel less accountable to the management by “providing a forum separate from management in 
which auditors […] can candidly discuss concerns” (SEC, 2003). To explore how a change in 
client type affects auditors’ reactions to potential threats to auditors’ independence, we use a 
post-experiment questionnaire to measure auditors’ perceived client retention incentives and 
accountability pressure.  
The experimental task consists of the evaluation of two accounting cases. The primary 
dependent variable is the audit opinion. We classify auditors’ independence as being at risk 
when auditors are willing to issue an unqualified opinion for a financial statement that reflects 
the management’s preference for aggressive accounting. This classification is consistent with 
Antle (1984), who suggests as a measure of auditors’ independence the willingness of 
auditors to follow the preferences of the manager. Our focus on auditors’ ability to be 
unbiased in their judgments relates especially to auditors’ objectivity as one dimension of 
auditor independence (Taylor et al., 2003). 
We find that auditors’ propensity to issue unqualified audit opinions is not affected by 
the type of client which indicates that auditors are generally able to maintain independence 
from the client. We further investigate the interaction effects of auditors’ client type and 
auditors’ reaction to potential threats to auditor independence. Our results show that auditors 
with high client retention incentives are more willing to accept the management’s preferred 
accounting method when they are employed by the management. However, auditors are less 
likely to do so when they are employed by a supervisory board. Furthermore, we find that 
perceived accountability pressure is a statistically significant effect: lower-rank auditors are 
more likely to issue unqualified audit opinions when they feel under high accountability 
  4
pressure for both types of client. These findings imply that on the one hand, an auditor that 
has an oversight board as its client seems to change the auditors’ reaction to financial 
incentives. On the other hand, this shift in the type of client does not seem to be effective in 
influencing auditors’ reaction to accountability pressure. 
Our experimental study on the effects of client type contributes to prior literature on 
auditor independence that has usually considered management as potential clients of auditors 
(e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996; Kadous et al., 2003; Blay, 2005). Further, experiments 
with alternative parties as auditors’ clients have only been designed in experiments with 
students as participants (Mayhew and Pike, 2004; Kadous et al., 2003: fn. 19). We also 
investigate whether client retention incentives and accountability pressure represent two 
distinctive threats to auditors’ independence. This test addresses the research gaps identified 
by Bamber and Iyer (2007: 2), that “(p)rior accounting research does not address the effect of 
social forces or incentives on auditors’ objectivity”, and by Bonner (2007: 220), that it is 
“crucial to attempt to separate the effects of social […] consequences from the effects of 
monetary consequences when studying accountability”. Prior research has investigated 
accountability pressure, but mainly in the context of hierarchical relationships within the audit 
firm and with limited attempts to separate the effects of financial incentives and 
accountability pressure (for a review see DeZoort and Lord, 1997). 
Our study adds to archival research by showing that strong audit committees are 
associated with higher financial reporting quality and, particularly, with higher audit quality 
(for reviews see Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Carcello et al., 2011). Although the archival 
literature identifies important determinants for audit committee effectiveness, it provides 
limited insights into the process how audit committee members influence auditor behaviour 
(Gendron et al., 2004). We investigate how oversight boards affect auditor behaviour via its 
impact on the effects of auditors’ accountability pressure and client retention incentives. 
Further, our experimental design avoids issues of endogeneity arising from the selection of 
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high quality auditors by high quality audit committees (e.g., Chen and Jian, 2007) and enables 
the use of more direct proxies for auditor independence (e.g., Dopuch et al., 2001). 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop our hypotheses by drawing 
from theory and prior auditing literature. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design, 
and in Section 4 we report the results. Section 5 concludes, and also addresses limitations. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1. Distinguishing client retention incentives and accountability pressure 
Accountability pressure and client retention incentives are often intertwined. For example, the 
importance of the client enhances both client retention incentives and accountability pressure 
(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Bamber and Iyer, 2007). But accountability pressure is distinct 
from client retention incentives, since it can also arise without the presence of monetary 
incentives, emerging purely from the desire to avoid conflict (Tetlock, 1985). We wish to 
distinguish between these two potential threats to auditors’ independence for two reasons. 
First, although auditors might be aware that they are influenced in their judgment by financial 
considerations, they may not be aware of the effects of accountability pressure. (Bazerman et 
al., 2002). Second, measures to ensure auditors’ independence might differ in their 
effectiveness, depending on the underlying threat to be remedied (Bamber and Iyer, 2007). 
For example, Moore et al. (2006) argue that in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the prohibition of 
certain non-audit services might have been effective in counteracting client retention 
incentives, but auditors’ independence would remain endangered due to accountability 
pressure. Our study, which varies the nature of the auditor-client relationship, we provide a 
natural setting for distinguishing between the effects of accountability pressure and financial 
incentives. 
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2.2. Client retention incentives and client type 
Economic theory suggests that the effects of client retention incentives on auditors’ 
independence depend on who the auditor's clients are. When auditors’ clients are the 
management, then client retention incentives can pose the danger that auditors become lenient 
in their audit decisions and are more willing to accept the management’s preferred accounting 
method than they should be (Magee and Tseng, 1990). But when auditors’ clients are 
oversight boards whose incentives are aligned with those of the investors, then the auditors’ 
independence can be enhanced and the auditors are less likely to accept an aggressive 
accounting method preferred by the management (Lee and Gu, 1998). The reason for these 
differing effects of different client types on auditors’ behaviour is that if their clients are 
independent oversight boards, then auditors no longer have to fear being replaced when they 
disagree with the management (Dye, 1991).  
Prior experimental studies find that auditors’ independence is at risk when auditors are 
hired by the management, at least when client retention incentives are high. For example, 
auditors are more willing to accept the accounting method proposed by the management when 
the risk of losing the client is high (e.g., Blay, 2005), when the client is important (e.g., Chang 
and Hwang, 2003), when the auditor’s compensation scheme rewards client retention (e.g., 
Trompeter, 1994), or when the client represents future business opportunities (e.g., Moreno 
and Bhattacharjee, 2003). The potential negative effects of client retention incentives on 
auditors’ independence are especially likely to occur when the auditor is highly committed to 
retaining the client (Kadous et al., 2003). Experiments with auditors have not investigated the 
effects of oversight boards as auditors’ clients yet. An abstract economic experiment with 
students as subjects suggests that it can have positive effects (Mayhew and Pike, 2004). 
Our first hypothesis investigates whether the type of client an auditor has affects 
auditors’ reactions to potential threats to their independent judgment. Based on the theory and 
experimental findings discussed above, we expect client type and client retention incentives to 
  7
have interactive effects. That is, we expect that a high level of client retention incentives can 
endanger an auditor’s independence when the auditor’s client is the management, but that 
high client retention incentives can enhance an auditor’s independence when the client is an 
oversight board.  
 
H1: The effects of client retention incentives on auditors’ behaviour depend on 
the type of client: Auditors with high client retention incentives are more 
likely to issue an unqualified opinion if their clients are management bodies 
that prefer aggressive accounting, and less likely to do so if their clients are 
supervisory boards that prefer conservative accounting. 
 
2.3. Accountability pressure and client type 
Another important threat to auditors’ independence is accountability pressure. Accountability 
pressure arises when a judgment or a decision has to be justified towards another party that 
the auditor considers important. When the view of that other party is known, people 
unintentionally adjust their own thinking towards the preferences of that party (Tetlock, 1985). 
This adjustment happens, because people seek the social approval of others (Schlenker, 1980) 
and attempt unconsciously to adopt a socially acceptable and compliant position (Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999). This judgment process is called the acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1985). 
Accountability is a multiple-source phenomenon. In auditing, important other parties 
to whom auditors must justify their opinion are the auditors' clients and superiors (Gibbins 
and Newton, 1994). Prior auditing research has focused on accountability pressure from 
superiors acting as reviewers within the audit firm (DeZoort and Lord, 1997). These studies 
show that the preferences of the superior can influence the behaviour of the subordinate 
auditor (e.g., Peecher, 1996). They also demonstrate that contextual features matter. For 
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example, the impact of accountability is stronger in a scenario where participants expect a 
face-to-face review compared to an electronic review (e.g., Wilks, 2002).  
Prior research on the effects of accountability pressure experienced by auditors 
towards their clients is limited. Accountability theory suggests that when management is the 
auditor’s client, there is a risk that auditors will unconsciously adopt the preferences of the 
management (Bazerman et al., 1997), because the antecedents for the acceptability heuristic 
are fulfilled: management acting as the client represents an important other party for the 
auditor; auditors have to justify their audit judgments and decisions to management (Gibbins 
et al., 2001; Sanchez et al., 2007); and auditors know management's preferred accounting 
method from the preliminary financial statements. Bamber and Iyer (2007) study 
accountability in a field-based analysis, and find that auditors who identify more strongly with 
management are more likely to acquiesce to the client-preferred treatment norms. One of the 
very rare studies that directly tests the source of accountability pressure is Buchman et al. 
(1996). In their experiment, these authors use three condition in which auditors are 
accountable to no one, to the management, or to the audit partner. They find weak evidence 
that auditors who are accountable towards the management use the acceptability heuristic. 
One important research question is whether audit committees that hold the auditor 
accountable are able to change the influence of management. Regulators hope that the 
oversight board, in acting as an auditor’s client, can provide “a forum separate from 
management in which auditors […] can candidly discuss concerns”, thereby ensuring “that the 
outside auditors, through their own review, objectively assess the company's financial 
reporting practices” (SEC, 2003). This effect is consistent with the acceptability heuristic 
under the premise that auditors consider the oversight board as an important party to whom 
they have to justify their judgments and decisions (e.g., ISA 260, SAS 114, SAS 115) and 
whose preferences they know, e.g., from discussions during the planning of the audit or from 
prior year audits. Our study addresses this research question by making use of the German 
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institutional setting. Investigating the effects of an oversight board is important given the 
context-dependence of accountability (Gibbins and Newton, 1994: 165). Further, it enables 
the examination of the effects of accountability on the behaviour of highly experienced 
auditors, since the pressure felt towards the client will probably be higher for them than the 
pressure felt towards a reviewer within the firm (Gibbins and Newton, 1994: 168).  
Based on the accountability theory, we formulate the following hypothesis, which 
predicts an interactive effect of accountability pressure and client type:  
 
H2: The effects of accountability pressure on auditors’ behaviour depend on the 
type of client: Auditors who feel that they are under high accountability 
pressures are more likely to issue an unqualified opinion if their clients are 
management bodies that prefer aggressive accounting, but are less likely to 
do so if their clients are supervisory boards that prefer conservative 
accounting. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Participants 
Two of the international Big 4 audit firms agreed to support our experiment. At one audit firm, 
auditors participated in the experiment at the end of the first day of a two-day training 
program designed for all levels of experience. This training program was held in three 
different regions in Germany. At the other audit firm, the experiment was conducted prior to a 
German nationwide partner/manager meeting, and the participants were asked to sign up for 
the experiment before the meeting. 
Our sample comprised 72 audit practitioners representing all levels of experience 
participated.3 Table 1 shows that the 21 staff auditors and the 18 audit seniors of our study 
have similar years of experience (medians are three and four years, respectively), and that the 
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18 experienced audit managers and 12 audit partner are highly experienced (medians are 11.5 
and 16 years, respectively). The variation in rank and years of experience within the 
experiment enables us to make supplemental explorations on the mitigating effects of 
experience. 
Our experimental tasks make a good fit for all experience levels. Staff and senior 
auditors regularly perform audit procedures on the appropriateness of allowance for bad debt 
and the valuation of provisions, and audit managers and partners review these procedures 
(Abdolmohammadi, 1999). The tasks include an indication of the audit opinion that will be 
issued. Although audit managers and partners make the final decision concerning the audit 
report disclosure, lower-rank auditors influence this decision (Ricchiute, 1999). Hence, 
auditing research regularly regards it as appropriate to ask staff and senior auditors about their 
audit report decision (e.g., Nelson and Kinney, 1997; Joe, 2003). To reflect the higher 
familiarity of managers and partners with the audit opinion decision, we conduct additionally 
subsample analyses that focus on the behaviour of manager and partners. We note that for our 
sample, this subsample construction is almost equivalent to a split by auditors’ years of 
experience, since the years of experience of audit managers and partners hardly overlap with 
those of staff and senior auditors. Table 1 illustrates this equivalency.  
 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
3.2 Procedure 
The format of all sessions was the same. To ensure that the experiment would proceed in a 
controlled manner, one of the authors was present in each session together with research 
assistants. Figure 1 shows the outline of the research procedure, which consisted of three parts. 
In the first part, we randomly determined for each auditor whether the client in question was 
the management or the supervisory board. In the first part we describe the firm characteristics, 
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client type, and the audit appointment process and pose framing questions. We also told the 
auditors that about one in eight would be randomly selected for a ten-minute simulated 
meeting with the client after the experiment. We randomly selected auditors for this meeting 
after each auditor had handed in the test materials. Then, each auditor was given the task of 
evaluating two ambiguous accounting cases. In the third part, the auditors filled out 
questionnaires that included questions related to their perceived client retention incentives, 
their feelings of accountability pressure, and their level of experience. 
 
--- Insert Figure 1 here --- 
 
3.3. Task and dependent variables 
Auditors evaluated their two accounting case studies under German GAAP. We use two case 
studies instead of one to enhance the generalizability of the results. We note that analyzing the 
two case studies individually yields results that are qualitatively similar to the combined 
results reported below. We randomly varied across participants the order in which the cases 
were presented. The first case covered the measurement of provisions for warranties and the 
second case covered allowances for bad debt. These accounting issues have often been 
considered in previous auditing research and are relevant to auditor-client meetings, since 
they affect reported earnings (Gibbins et al., 2001). We designed the cases to be ambiguous, 
since prior research suggests that auditors’ independence is most strongly affected by client 
retention incentives (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996; Salterio and Koonce, 1997) and 
accountability pressure (Boiney et al., 1997) when no clear guidelines exist. We developed 
the design of experiment in collaboration with audit practitioners. We pretested the materials 
in one mail-based testing, using ten audit practitioners as participants, and in two in-class 
sessions with students as participants. 
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At the beginning of each case study, we presented the accounting method used by the 
audited company in its preliminary financial statement. In line with the preferences of the 
management, we constructed very aggressive accounting methods. Then we introduced five 
pieces of evidence stepwise, thus simulating the audit process in which the auditor gathers 
audit evidence step by step. This procedure also made it possible for us to elicit auditors’ 
evaluations of each piece of evidence immediately after it was presented, and it ensured that 
the participants were motivated to consider all pieces of evidence carefully. The auditors 
judged the conformity of each company’s accounting method with GAAP, chose the 
appropriate measurement amount, and decided what audit opinion to issue if the audited firm 
was not willing to record any adjustments. Table 2 provides the details on the eliciting and 
coding of all dependent variables.  
Our primary dependent variable is the audit opinion, since issuing the correct audit 
opinion is the auditor’s primary task. Furthermore, we assume that the client is especially 
concerned about receiving an unqualified opinion when making the decision regarding 
whether to retain the auditor (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981), which is also why auditors experience 
the strongest need for justification and high accountability pressure for this decision 
(Buchman et al., 1996; Turner, 2001). 
We classify audit opinion as a binary variable. We code unqualified opinions as one 
and both qualified and adverse opinions as zero. Our results hold when classifying audit 
opinion as an ordinal variable by coding unqualified opinions as two, qualified opinions as 
one and adverse opinions as zero, and when classifying audit opinion as a continuous variable. 
In our analyses, we use logistic regressions by pooling all data. This results in a total of 144 
observations from 72 auditors. The main logistic regression analyses include 132 observations 
from 67 auditors due to missing data (3x audit opinion, 6x hierarchy level, 2x accountability 
pressure, 8x client retention incentives; multiple missing data items for some observations). 
The results of these analyses hold when including subject as a random effect. 
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--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
 
3.4. Treatment variable: client type 
We randomly assigned the type of client. Thirty-seven subjects were accountable to the 
management and 35 auditors answered to the supervisory board. We established the 
accountability relationship by informing auditors about the background of the audit 
engagement. The auditors were told that either the management or the supervisory board had 
hired them, what their client's preferences were, and that a meeting with their client would 
take place at the end of the session, at which time the auditor should be ready to defend his or 
her audit judgments and decisions. After auditors had received this information, we asked 
them to characterize this scenario and to describe similar scenarios that they themselves had 
experienced. These framing questions were intended to ensure that auditors internalized the 
experimental setting. Furthermore, participants were reminded of their client's identity by our 
repeating throughout the experimental tasks that auditors’ responses will be forwarded to 
either the management or the supervisory board. 
The uniqueness of the German institutional setting made it possible for us to 
realistically vary the auditors’ clients. To avoid confounding demand effects, a realistic 
description is essential in an experiment with professional auditors. In Germany, as in many 
code law countries, a two-tier board structure is in place for limited companies (e.g., 
Schöndube-Pirchegger and Schöndube, 2010).4 A two-tier board structure means that the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the management (Vorstand/Geschäftsführung) are two 
distinct bodies of the corporation (e.g., Leuz and Wüstemann, 2004). While the management 
governs the company, the supervisory board controls the management. Under the Corporate 
Control and Transparency Act of 1998, the supervisory board became generally responsible 
for nominating the auditor for election at the annual shareholder meeting, appointing the 
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auditor, and negotiating the compensation terms (Gassen and Skaife, 2009). Furthermore, the 
supervisory board is now the primary recipient of auditor’s internal long-form audit report 
(Leuz and Wüstemann, 2004). However, the management is still responsible for appointing 
the auditor in private limited companies with fewer than 500 employees that are not required 
to have a supervisory board (Theisen, 2007).5 Because all corporations with more than 50 but 
fewer than 500 employees are required by law to be audited6, either the management or the 
supervisory board can be in charge of nominating the statutory auditor. Furthermore, when 
comparing companies that are slightly above or below that threshold, the legal threshold of 
500 employees makes the presence of a supervisory board as auditors’ client largely an 
exogenous factor.  
Concerning auditors’ appointment, in Germany, in the other members states of the 
European Union, and in the U.S., the institutional settings are comparable in many ways. The 
German Corporate Control and Transparency Act of stressed the role of the supervisory board 
as auditors’ client, and the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the European Directive on 
statutory audits of 2006 did the same with the audit committee. However, it is possible to vary 
the auditors’ client within the German institutional setting in a more realistic and more clear-
cut way than, for example, within the U.S. institutional setting. German federal law and 
corporate bylaws give the management the explicit authority to be auditors’ client for a large 
number of companies with mandatory audits, but in statutory audits in the U.S., the 
management cannot formally be the auditor's client. Only informally can management be the 
key decision-maker in determining auditors’ appointment at some companies in the U.S. 
(Cohen et al., 2010).  
In our experiment, the management prefers aggressive reporting. In the description, 
we state that management would miss earnings forecasts, forfeit bonus payments, and risk 
being dismissed if it opts for a more conservative accounting method. We choose this 
characterization of the management, because we want to simulate the perspective of 
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regulators who are concerned that auditors’ independence is at risk when they face 
management with strong incentives to increase earnings (SEC, 2003). This assumption about 
the incentives is also in line with empirical findings that management regularly engages in 
earnings management (Nelson et al., 2002). 
We describe the supervisory board as preferring conservative reporting. In the 
description, we note that the members face litigation risk if there is aggressive reporting 
(Lederer, 2006) and that to ensure the viability of the company, the members wish to restrict 
possibilities for future dividend payouts (Leuz and Wüstemann, 2004). In reality, although 
oversight board members are supposed to be independent, to reduce litigation risk they have 
incentives to favour conservative reporting (Hoi et al., 2007). Therefore, oversight board 
members are likely to have preferences that maintain their financial reporting integrity 
(Pomeroy, 2010).  
The way we use client types varies both client identity and client preferences. This 
joint variation is intended to reflect reality, and contrasts the two client types that are most 
interesting in the context of auditor independence regulation. One of our important aims is to 
ensure the statistical power of experiment our research by increasing the strength of the 
treatment effect (Shadish et al., 2002: 47). We expect that joint variation of both constructs 
increases the overall strength of the treatment, since the resulting conditions portray the two 
client types most opposed to each other. Doing so provides a test that is statistically and 
sufficiently powerful on whether client type has any effect on auditor behaviour, but it does 
not allow for a distinction between client identity or client preferences as potential sources of 
such an effect. Thus, we do not separately test for the effects of client identity and client 
preferences due to constraints in the number of highly experienced participants. 
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3.5. Measured independent variables: client retention incentives, accountability pressure, and 
auditors’ rank 
As described above, client retention incentives and accountability pressure are interrelated. 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between these two potential threats to auditors’ 
independence, since the effectiveness of remedies for mitigating these threats might depend 
on the source of the threats. We follow Bonner’s (2007: 220) recommendation that post-
experiment questions be used to distinguish between the two different threats (see Table 3 for 
details on the measured and treatment variables). 
Client retention incentives depend on the importance of the client (DeAngelo, 1981) 
and the likelihood that the client will switch the audit firm in case of disagreements (Dye, 
1991; Lennox, 2000). We construct a setting with high client retention incentives. We 
describe the client as being very important, because it contributes one-fourth of the total audit 
fees of the local office. We describe the risk of dismissal as being very high because the client 
has demonstrated in the past that it is willing to switch auditors if there is any disagreement. 
In a post-experiment questionnaire, we elicit a proxy for perceived client retention incentives 
by aggregating auditors’ evaluation of two questions. First, we ask auditors how likely they 
consider the threat of being dismissed if there is client-auditor dissent. Second, we ask 
auditors how likely they consider that other auditors will make concessions in judgment based 
on this threat.  
In our study, we create accountability pressure by requiring auditors to justify their 
decisions to the clients, both in written form and in an announced face-to-face meeting 
(Brazel et al., 2004; DeZoort et al., 2006). We ensure that auditors are aware of the 
justification requirement by repeating it before each judgment and decision task. In our post-
experiment questionnaire, we asked auditors to what extent they would insist on maintaining 
their audit judgments to their colleagues, and then asked them how strong their desire was to 
avoid conflict with their clients in the upcoming meetings. The first question measures 
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subjects’ perceived personal responsibility as “responsibility is a necessary component of the 
process of holding people accountable for their conduct” (Schlenker et al., 1994: 634). The 
second questions measures conflict avoidance as another concept underlying accountability, 
since subjects with a high degree of desire to avoid conflict have been found to be especially 
sensitive to accountability pressure (Chen et al., 1996; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). The 
aggregate answer to these two questions is our proxy for perceived accountability pressure. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
 
3.6. Relation between independent variables 
In Table 4 we examine the relation between the independent variables. First, because we are 
interested in investigating whether our constructs for client retention incentives and 
accountability pressure measure different aspects. We find that client retention incentives and 
accountability pressure are not significantly correlated in the full sample (ρ = 0.11; p = 0.386), 
which suggests that the two constructs are distinct from each other. Second, our analysis 
serves as a check on whether client type or auditors’ rank has unanticipated effects on the 
subjective measured variables. We find that client type has no significant effects on these 
variables. This finding is also supported by the descriptive statistics, which do not indicate 
major differences across client type. 
 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and effects of client type 
Table 5 indicates that auditors perceive managements’ accounting method choices to be 
overly aggressive. Auditors issue unqualified opinion only in about half of the time (mean 
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(SD) = 0.47 (0.5)) and require, on average, write-downs of €39.8M (SD = €36.3M). Further, 
they evaluate managements’ accounting method choices to be not fully in conformance with 
GAAP (mean (SD) = 4.25 (3.16)), and also do not consider the pieces of audit evidence as 
supporting these choices (mean (SD) = -2.76 (8.48)). These descriptive results also hold for 
the subsample of managers and partners, with the exception that these auditors are even more 
sceptical in their evaluation of evidence.  
In Table 5, the analysis of the overall effect of client type on auditors’ behaviour 
reveals no indications that auditors generally acquiesce to clients’ preferences in their audit 
opinions decisions. Auditors who are employed by a management that favours aggressive 
accounting issue unqualified opinions in 49% of all cases, and auditors employed by 
supervisory boards that prefer conservative accounting issue unqualified opinions in 45% of 
all cases. We find no significant difference for the measurement decision on the amount of 
necessary adjustments (€41.3M compared to -€38.3M). However, we find that auditors are 
influenced by client type in judgment tasks. Auditors who are employed by management 
consider audit evidence more often in contradiction to the aggressive accounting method 
chosen in the financial statements, and they judge the financial statements conformity with 
German GAAP to be lower. Again, our results hold for the subsample of managers and 
partners except for a qualitatively similar, but nonsignificant difference in the judgment of 
GAAP conformance by client type. 
 
--- Insert Table 5 here --- 
 
We use a structural-equation-based path analysis to further investigate the effects of 
client type on auditors’ judgment and their subsequent audit decision. Figure 2 presents the 
model with audit evidence evaluation as the judgment task and audit opinion choice as the 
decision task. The goodness of fit of the model is excellent (chi-square = 0.007, 3 df, p = 1). 
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The results for the full sample of all observations show, first of all, an indirect effect of client 
on auditors’ decisions via auditors’ judgement. Auditors hired by a management with 
preferences for aggressive reporting are more sceptical towards the presented audit evidence 
(Link 1, Coef. = -5.71, p < 0.001) which, in turn, reduces the auditor's propensity to issue an 
unqualified audit opinion (Link 2; Coef. = 0.018, p < 0.001). But client type has also a direct 
effect (Link 3, Coef. = 0.14, p = 0.077), which means that auditors employed by management 
are more likely to issue an unqualified opinion. The indirect effect (Links 1 and 2, Coef. = -
0.1, p < 0.001) and the direct effect (Link 3) neutralize each other, leading to nonsignificant 
total effect (Coef. = 0.04, p = 0.609). Figure 2 shows that the results are qualitatively similar 
for the subsample of managers and partners.  
These results can be explained with Turner's (2001) theory. According to Turner, the 
researcher has to distinguish between belief and action tasks when investigating the effects of 
motivational factors. Turner defines belief tasks as judgments that do not directly affect the 
audit outcome, e.g., the evaluation of audit evidence; action tasks refer to decisions that 
directly affect the audit outcome, e.g., the audit opinion decision. In either belief or judgment 
tasks, auditors are concerned about quality. This theory explains why auditors in our test are 
sceptical about their clients’ preferences when evaluating evidence, since one dimension of 
audit quality is professional scepticism (Gramling, 1999).7  The theory further states that 
people experience feelings of responsibility most intimately for action or decision tasks 
(Tversky, 1972; Turner, 2001). These feelings intensify accountability pressure (Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999), and potentially underlie the observed direct effect of client type. 
In our scenario the audit opinion choice is the most important audit decision. 
Consistent with the reasoning that accountability pressure is highest for this variable, we find 
that substituting the measurement decision for the audit opinion decision in the model 
reported in Figure 2 yields slightly weaker direct effects of client type (untabulated). Further, 
the main and interaction effects of the measured independent variables are not significant for 
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measurement and the other dependent variables (untabulated). Thus, we concentrate on the 
audit opinion as the dependent variable in this and the following analyses.  
 
--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
 
4.2. Effects of client retention incentives and client type 
In H1 we predicted that the influence of client type on auditors’ decision to accept an 
aggressive accounting method would depend on the level of auditors’ client retention 
incentives. In Table 6 we test H1 in a logistic regression analysis. Our regression analysis 
includes a dummy variable for the case study as control. The significance of this variable 
indicates that auditors are more likely to issue an unqualified opinion for Case Study 1 
(provisions for warranties) than for Case Study 2 (accounts receivable). However, all 
interaction effects between a variable for the case version and any of the independent 
variables are not significant, indicating that behavioural effects in response to the independent 
variables generalize across both cases (untabulated). 
Consistent with our expectation, the interaction between client type and client 
retention incentives is marginally significant (p = 0.083; see Table 6 and Figure 3). This 
interaction effect indicates that auditors with high client retention incentives are more likely to 
issue unqualified audit opinions when their clients are management bodies that favour 
aggressive accounting. It implies that giving supervisory boards that favour conservative 
accounting the authority to hire the auditor can encourage that auditor to be more critical in its 
decision to accept or reject an aggressive accounting method chosen by the management. 
The interaction effect between client type and client retention holds for a subsample 
analysis of audit managers and partners (p = 0.033). This finding does not support the 
reasoning that higher-ranking auditors are more likely to withstand client retention incentives 
because they are more aware of the presence of counteracting incentives, such as litigation or 
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reputation risks (e.g., Moreno and Bhattacharjee, 2003). Instead, our finding is in line with 
prior studies showing that auditors of higher rank are sensitive to client retention incentives, 
because their performance evaluation and compensation often rely strongly on the fee they 
generate (e.g., Haynes et al., 1998). 
 
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
--- Insert Figure 3 here --- 
 
4.3. Effects of accountability pressure and client type 
In H2 we predicted that the influence of client type on an auditor’s decision to accept an 
aggressive accounting method would depend on the level of that auditor’s self-reported 
feelings of accountability. However, our results are not fully consistent with this hypothesis, 
since the interaction effect of accountability pressure on client type is not significant (p = 
0.235; see Table 6). Instead, we find that accountability pressure has a significant main effect 
on audit opinions (p = 0.019; see Table 6). This result suggests that auditors risk having their 
independence impaired not only when they are employed by a management that favours 
aggressive accounting, but also when they are employed by an oversight board that prefers 
conservative accounting. One explanation might be that auditors still feel accountable towards 
the management even if their clients are oversight boards. This accountability feeling might 
be the present, since oversight boards often play a passive role in resolving contentious 
accounting issues in reality (Cohen et al., 2010). Therefore, we speculate that as an auditor’s 
client, it is difficult for an oversight board to influence the auditor through accountability 
pressure.  
However, further analyses show that the main effect of accountability pressure is 
significant for the subsample of lower-rank auditors (p = 0.01), but is not significant for the 
subsample of higher-rank auditors. An explanation for the finding that managers and partners 
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judgment is not affected by accountability pressure could be that auditors of higher rank 
possess greater communication and interpersonal skills (Tan and Libby, 1997). 
 
5. Conclusion 
In an experiment with professional auditors, we examined the influence of client type on 
auditors’ objectivity as one dimension of auditor independence. We find that auditors' 
reaction to potential threats to their independence depend on the type of client. First, we find 
evidence for a difference in behaviour based on client retention incentives. Auditors who are 
employed by the management and who report high client retention incentives are likely to 
acquiesce to the management’s preferences, but auditors who are employed by supervisory 
boards and report the same incentives are more likely to resist. Second, we observe that 
auditors’ behaviour does not depend on client type when the auditors feel that they are under 
high accountability pressure. Specifically, lower-ranking auditors who perceive a high 
accountability pressure become more lenient towards the management’s preferred accounting 
method in both client conditions. Therefore, these results imply that auditors consider that 
oversight boards are in charge of making decisions regarding their reappointment or 
termination, but that auditors still feel accountable to the management. Our findings also 
provide evidence that client retention incentives and accountability pressure are potential 
threats to auditors’ independence. These threats are distinct from each other, and the 
effectiveness of potential remedies differs for the two different threats (e.g., Bazerman et al., 
2006). 
Researchers should consider the following limitations of the experimental design 
when interpreting the results. First, we measure client retention incentives and accountability 
pressure instead of randomly varying these factors. We do so because the two threats to 
auditors’ independence are usually intertwined in reality. While this choice ensures the 
realism of the experimental setting, which is essential in experiments with professional 
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auditors, it reduces the ability to draw causal inferences. Second, we make use of the German 
two-tier system in which the supervisory board takes over the role of the oversight board. 
Although there is no theoretical reason why our results for a supervisory board as auditors’ 
client should not extend to an audit committee as an auditors’ client in a one-tier system, it is 
an empirical question that we leave for future research. Third, auditors are likely to 
experience changes in the parties to whom they feel most accountable over their career 
(Gibbins and Newton, 1994). The static nature of our study precludes the testing how these 
changes affect auditor’ behaviour. 
Finally, we note that we contrast the alleged problematic setting in which a 
management body with incentives that encourage aggressive reporting is the auditor’s client 
with the setting in which a supervisory board with incentives that encourage conservative 
reporting is the client. Our aim was to reconstruct client types at both typical and strong levels, 
and by doing so to create a powerful test of the research question: whether client type can 
influence auditors’ independence. One downside to this approach is that it is not possible to 
infer whether the results are driven by client identity or client preferences. In future research, 
researchers might attempt to disentangle the two factors by controlling for them separately. 
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1 We combine both the audit committees and supervisory boards under the umbrella term “oversight board”. 
2 German supervisory board members face mainly internal liability threats with the company itself being the 
claimant. The overall level of their liability threat is comparable to those of UK non-executive members (Lederer 
2006). Given the internal nature of the liability threat and the lack of empirical studies on the subject, we argue 
that there is no compelling reason why liability threats should not play a role in the context of German private 
companies. 
3 In total, 84 subjects participated. We excluded 12 participants who indicated IT-auditing, tax consulting or 
consulting as their main field. Our main results hold, nevertheless, when we include all 84 subjects in our 
analysis. Among the 72 subjects indicated auditing as their main field, 52 were male and 15 were female auditors; 
five participants did not indicate their gender. 
4 This applies to stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften). It also applies to private limited corporations 
(Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung) with more than 500 employees who are required to form a 
supervisory board under section 1, paragraph 3 of the One-Third Codetermination Act (Gesetz über die 
Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat, Drittbeteiligungsgesetz). 
5 Section 52 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbHG (Private Limited Liability 
Company Act). Furthermore, private limited companies are free to pass corporate bylaws that can even give 
management the power to directly choose the auditor. 
6 Sections 267, 316 Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code) requires a company to be audited when two 
of the following three requirements are fulfilled in two consecutive financial years: more than 50 employees 
based on an annual average; a balance sheet total of more than €4,840,000;sales of above €9,680,000.  
7 An alternative explanation for the higher level of doubt expressed by auditors employed by management could 
be that the description of the management preferences as favouring aggressive accounting influences auditors 
towards high fraud risk. If this were the case, then auditors would be expected to be especially doubtful about 
evidence provided by management. We do not find support for this explanation. Auditors hired by management 
show the same level of scepticism for evidence provided by management as for evidence provided by other 
sources. This behaviour is indicated by a nonsignificant interaction effect between client type and a dummy 
variable for evidence type (one indicates that a piece of evidence is provided by management; and zero 
otherwise) on evidence evaluation (untabulated). Furthermore, auditors do not differ by client type in their 
written justifications of their decisions. Auditors hired by the management state even slightly more often that 
they have relied on evidence provided by management compared to auditors hired by the oversight board (full 
sample: 39 compared to 32 times; subsample of managers/partners: 14 compared to 11 times). 
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Figure 1. Procedure 
Part 1 
 
Background information 
Random assignment of 
auditors to client condition 
Information on clients’ 
preferences 
Announcement that one in 
eight auditors will have a 
client meeting at the end of 
the study in which they will 
need to defend their 
judgments. 
Framing questions about the 
setting 
 
 Part 2 
 
Accounting cases 
Information on preliminary 
financial statement 
Stepwise presentation of five 
pieces of evidence 
Questions on auditors’ 
judgments and decisions. 
 
 Part 3 
 
Questionnaire 
Post-experiment 
questionnaire on 
demographic data and 
threats to auditors’ 
independence 
Treatment variable 
Management favouring 
aggressive accounting  
Supervisory board 
favouring conservative 
accounting 
Dependent variables 
Audit opinion 
Measurement 
GAAP conformance 
Audit evidence 
(See Table 2 for details) 
Measured variables 
Client retention  
incentives (CRI) 
Accountability  
pressure (AP) 
(see Table 3 for details) 
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Figure 2. Empirical path model of the effects of client type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the results of a path analysis designed to simultaneously test the direct effect (Link 3) and indirect effect 
(Links 1 and 2) of client type on audit opinion for both the full sample and the subsample of managers/partners. The figure 
shows the nonstandardized path coefficient next to each link. The model also controls for the effects of case (indicator 
variable for case study type [provisions; receivables]; not shown in the figure) on audit evidence (full sample = 4.30***; 
subsample = 7.07***) and on audit opinion (full sample = 0.32***; subsample = 0.44***). The goodness of fit of the model 
is excellent (full sample: Chi-square = 0.007; df = 3; p = 1, n = 141; subsample: Chi-square = 0.003; df = 3; p = 1, n = 58). 
Client type: management favouring aggressive accounting compared toa supervisory board favouring conservative 
accounting. 
Audit evidence: evaluation of consistency of audit evidence and firm’s accounting method [-25 to +25]. 
Audit opinion: type of audit opinion issued [1: unqualified opinion; 0: qualified or adverse opinion]. 
***/**/*: significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level (two-tailed).
Client type [management] 
 
Audit evidence 
 
Audit opinion 
 
Link 2 
Full sample :  +0.018*** 
Subsample:  +0.016** 
 Link 3 
Full sample: 0.14* 
Subsample:  0.19* 
 
Link 1 & 2 
Full sample:  -0.10*** 
Subsample:  -0.08** 
 
Link 1 
Full sample: -5.71*** 
Subsample:  -4.78*** 
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Figure 3. Interactive effect of client type and client retention incentives (CRI) on the audit opinion 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CRI 
 
Panel B: Subsample of managers/partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CRI 
This figure shows the interaction effect of client retention incentives (CRI) and client type [M vs. S] on the audit opinion. 
See Table 6 for the underlying regression model. 
Client type: management [M] favouring aggressive accounting compared to a supervisory board [S] favouring conservative 
accounting. 
Audit opinion: type of audit opinion issued [1: unqualified opinion; 0: qualified or adverse opinion]. 
Client retention incentives (CRI): combined measure of the assessed threat of losing the client and other auditors’ likely 
reaction to such a threat. 
 
S
M
M
S
 
Audit 
opinion 
 
Audit 
opinion 
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Table 1. Number of years of participants’ auditing experience by auditors’ rank. 
 n  1Q. Med. 3Q.  Mean SD 
Staff 21  2 3 4.5  3.28 1.27 
Seniors 18  3.9 4 6  6.65 6.60 
Managers 18  9 11.5 16.5  13.78 7.64 
Partners 11  14.5 16 24.5  19.00 8.75 
Overall 68  2 5 36  9.50 8.47 
Reported is the maximum number of available observations. 
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Table 2. Dependent variables. 
Type of 
task 
Dependent 
variable 
Elicitation method Characteristics 
Decision/
action 
task 
Audit 
opinion  
(primary 
dependent 
variable) 
“What audit opinion 
would you issue?” 
Coding of audit opinions: 
- unqualified opinion (= 1) 
- qualified or adverse opinion (= 0)  
Measure-
ment 
“In your opinion, 
what value should be 
reported in the 
financial statement 
under German 
GAAP?” 
Adjustments as the difference of auditor’s 
measurement and the measurement in the 
preliminary financial statement. 
Possible ranges for adjustments: 
+15 to -110 Mio. € for the provision case,  
+10 to -115 Mio. € for the receivables case.  
(Negative values indicate that auditor’s 
measurement would have an income 
decreasing effect.) 
Judgment/ 
belief task 
GAAP 
conform-
ance 
“Is the accounting 
method used in 
conformance with 
German GAAP?” 
11-point Likert scale ranging from  
0 (= not in conformance with GAAP) to  
10 (= fully in conformance with GAAP). 
Audit 
evidence 
How do you evaluate 
this piece of 
evidence? 
11-point Likert scale ranging from 
-5 (= fully inconsistent) to  
+5 (= fully consistent) for each piece. 
-25 to +25 aggregated over all five pieces of 
each case. 
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Table 3. Independent variables 
 Elicitation method Classification 
Client type Random assignment Client:  
management favouring aggressive 
reporting (37 auditors);  
supervisory board favouring 
conservative reporting (35 auditors) 
Client 
retention 
incentives 
(CRI) 
Risk of losing the client 
“In your experience, what is the 
proportion of audits where the 
auditor is likely to be replaced in the 
case of dissent between the auditor 
and the management [supervisory 
board]?” 
11-point Likert scale ranging from  
0 (0%) to 10 (100%). 
Mean (SD) = 3.61 (2.38) 
Reaction to the risk of losing the 
client  
“Do you agree to the following 
statement: ‘In this study, auditors are 
more willing to adjust their judgment 
to the accounting method preferred 
by the audited company when they 
have to fear losing the client.’” 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (= fully disagree) to 7 (= fully 
agree). 
Mean (SD) = 4.50 (1.67) 
Client retention incentives (CRI) = 
risk of losing the client + 
auditors’ reaction to the risk of 
losing the client 
Account-
ability 
pressure 
(AP)  
Conflict avoidance 
“In this study, I had the intention to 
avoid conflict in the prospective 
meeting with the management 
[supervisory board]” 
7-point Likert scale ranging from  
1 (= fully disagree) to 7 (= fully 
agree). 
Mean (SD) = 2.80 (1.90) 
Personal responsibility 
“I would persist on my evaluations 
[stated in this study] even if other 
colleagues from my audit firm 
disagreed.” 
7-point Likert scale ranging from  
1 (= fully disagree) to 7 (= fully 
agree). 
Mean (SD) = 3.37 (1.56) 
Accountability pressure (AP) =  
conflict avoidance +  
personal responsibility 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and relation between independent variables 
 Management 
favouring  
aggressive acct. 
Supervisory board 
favouring 
conservative acct. 
Overall t Test 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p 
Client 
retention 
incentives 
(CRI) 
Full 
sample 
7.57 (3.12) 8.70 (3.61) 8.12 (3.38) 0.175 
n = 35 
 
n =33 n = 68  
Only 
managers/
partners 
6.65 (2.83) 8.54 (4.07) 7.47 (3.49) 0.189 
n = 17 
 
n = 13 n = 30  
Account-
ability 
pressure 
(AP) 
Full 
sample 
6.35 (2.47) 5.97 (2.29) 6.17 (2.37) 0.503 
n = 37 
 
n = 34 n = 71  
Only 
managers/
partners 
6.29 (2.64) 6.31 (2.66) 6.30 (2.60) 0.919 
n = 17 
 
n = 13 n = 30  
The table shows that the variation of client type has no statistically significant effects on the measured variables. 
Further tests show that CRI and AP are not statistically significantly correlated in the full sample (ρ = 0.11; p-
value = 0.386), and are marginally significantly correlated in the subsample of managers/partners (ρ = 0.36; p-
value = 0.051). 
Client retention incentives (CRI): combined measure of the assessed threat of losing the client and other 
auditors’ likely reaction to such a threat. 
Accountability pressure (AP): combined measure of the assessed level of conflict avoidance and feelings of 
responsibilities. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables by client type. 
  Management 
favouring  
aggressive acct. 
Supervisory 
board favouring 
conservative acct.
Overall  p +  
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Audit 
opinion 
 
Full sample 0.49 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.608  
n = 72 
 
n = 69 n = 141   
Only manager/ 
partner 
0.53 (0.50) 0.42 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.339  
n = 32 
 
n = 26 n = 58   
Measure-
ment 
Full sample -41.3 (35.4) -38.3 (37.5) 39.8 (36.3) 0.521  
n = 72 
 
n = 69 n = 141   
Only manager/ 
partner 
-34.5 (38.9) -43.7 (38.5) 38.6 (38.7) 0.262  
n = 32 
 
n = 26 n = 58   
GAAP 
conform-
ance 
Full sample 3.64 (3.07) 4.89 (3.11) 4.25 (3.16) 0.012 ** 
n = 73 
 
n = 69 n = 142   
Only manager/ 
partner 
4.33 (3.14) 4.80 (3.61) 4.53 (3.33) 0.653  
n = 33 
 
n = 25 n = 58   
Audit  
evidence 
Full sample -5.55 (7.29) 0.19 (8.69) -2.76 (8.48) 0.026 ** 
n = 74 
 
n = 70 n = 144   
Only manager/ 
partner 
-6.26 (8.95) -1.69 (8.55) -4.28 (8.51) <0.001 ***
n = 34 
 
n = 26 n = 60   
This table shows that auditors employed by a management that favours aggressive accounting are more sceptical 
in judgment tasks (GAAP conformance, audit evidence) than are auditors employed by a supervisory board that 
favours conservative accounting, but not in decision tasks (measurement, audit opinion). 
Audit opinion: type of audit opinion issued [1: unqualified opinion; 0: qualified or adverse opinion]. 
Measurement: effects of applying auditor’s measurement decision on firm’s income [-110/115 to +10/15]. 
GAAP conformance: evaluation of the conformance of firm’s accounting method with GAAP [1 to 11]. 
Audit evidence: evaluation of consistency of audit evidence and firm’s accounting method [-25 to +25]. 
+ Test is on the effects of client type including an indicator variable for case version as a control. 
***/**/*: significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
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Table 6. Logistic regression analyses on the audit opinion 
Term (1) Full sample (2) Subsample of 
managers/partners 
Intercept -1.10 
(0.36) 
[0.002] 
-1.86 
(0.69) 
[0.007] 
Client type [management]  0.33 
(0.40) 
[0.407] 
0.98 
(0.74) 
[0.187] 
Client retention incentives (CRI) -0.08 
(0.08) 
[0.324] 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
[0.341] 
CRI * client [management] 0.21 
(0.12) 
[0.083] 
0.58 
(0.27) 
[0.033] 
Accountability pressure (AP) 0.31 
(0.13) 
[0.019] 
0.10  
(0.20) 
[0.616] 
AP * client [management]  -0.20 
(0.17) 
[0.235] 
-0.43 
(0.31) 
[0.160] 
Case [provision] 1.79 
(0.40) 
[<0.001] 
2.95 
(0.75) 
[<0.001] 
This table shows that the client type interacts with perceived client retention incentives (H1). The table shows 
the coefficients (standard errors) [p-values]; estimates are for log ratios of 1/0 of audit opinion [unqualified 
opinion vs. qualified and adverse opinion]; significant treatment effects are in bold. 
(1) Full sample: R2 (Pseudo) = 0.17; n = 134 
(2) Subsample of managers/partners: R2 (Pseudo) = 0.32; n = 58 
Ai and Norton (2003) suggest that p-values of interaction terms in logit models might be biased. Using their 
suggested correction for this bias yields the following p-values for the interaction between client retention 
incentives and client type: Model 1: p (corr.) = 0.091; Model 2: p (corr.) = 0.083. 
Client type: management favouring aggressive accounting compared to a supervisory board favouring 
conservative accounting. 
Client retention incentives (CRI): combined measure of the assessed threat of losing the client and other 
auditors’ likely reaction to such a threat. 
Accountability pressure (AP): combined measure of the assessed level of conflict avoidance and feelings of 
responsibilities. 
Case: indicator variable for type of accounting case [provision; receivables]. 
 
